With the development of mobile communication technology, there are more and more concern about the mobile cyber security. However, numerous existing authentication solutions have the issues as encryption and decryption keys long, slow, consuming large storage space and transmission bandwidth. This article presents an approach based on elliptic curve cryptography is suitable for the identity of the mobile terminal lightweight equipment certification program, which improve efficiency, while reducing the bandwidth consumption of transmission. Therefore, the solution has a great potentiality in the application of intelligent terminal.
Introduction
With the fast development of mobile communication technology, as well as its own mobile platform openness and flexibility, mobile phone has became indispensable in people's lives and work. Meanwhile, it has also become another target for hackers. Because of the data theft, tampering; unauthorized users of theft, attacks and other malicious programs for mobile platforms the security issues have become increasingly prominent. So what protective measures adopted to protect the safety of mobile phone is the focus of attention [2] .
With the development of the theory of the cipher code, the mobile terminal may also need to implement user authentication. In document [3] , a bidirectional authentication solution based on ELGamal digital signature was proposed against the flaws of low efficient authentication and complicated process. However the proposed solution also has the flaws as the key has to be exchanged face to face, and the certification process is too cumbersome. As an enhancement, document [4] proposed an bidirectional authentication solution based on ELGamal digital signature which improved the secured transmission over common signal tunnel, with no necessity of face to face password exchange, simplified the authentication process as well for better efficiency. However, the solution can't prevent the fraud attack, yet the algorithm for public key of ELGamal is too complicated to be applied in a light mobile device to avoid huge heat, slow response and burning of the precision device.
In today's public-key cryptosystem, ECC key system has the highest per-bit security strength, and has a short key, fast speed, high security and low computational complexity [5] as advantage. Therefore, by taking advantage of elliptic curve cryptography system, this paper proposes an identity authentication solution based on ECC for light mobile device with the idea of document [4] . The solution remains the same security of the original solution proposed in document [4] , meanwhile it simplify the key negotiation, enhance the efficiency by deducting the complexity of the identity certification. Because of the above advantages the solution is applicable for the mobile communication. Its innovation lies in: (1) A secure channel isn't compulsory to get the keys, which improves the flexibility of key management. (2) It decreases the calculation burden of key negotiation and authentication processes; improve the efficiency of authentication, applicable for mobile communication; (3) it is easy to implement authentication and digital signatures in a distributed environment.
1.ECC-based Bidirectional Authentication Solution
The authentication solution is divided into three steps: registration, the key acquisition and user authentication. The certification idea is based on digital signature of elliptic curve encryption algorithms.
Symbols specification is used in the solution:
Fq is a selected finite field, E(Fq) is the elliptic curve on a finite field Fq, G is the E(Fq) base point of the elliptic curve, n (a large prime number), A and B denotes the two-user, IDA and IDB presents the flag information of A and B, H() is the hash function.
In this solution, LRA is the advance operation of a trusted local registration authority center:
② Open the public key information to system:E(Fq)， G， Y， n. Reserve the private key d.
User Register
（1）user h offline register to the closest LRA, the detail registration procedure is as blow:
as the temporary public key.t1 = x1 mod n, if t1 = 0,then return to step ①, then send the message { ℎ , C1} to LRA.
（2）When LRA receive the message, then do the following calculation:
① m1 = ID h ⨁ID LRA ⊕ T h ，and present m1 as a domain element P m 1 . Above T h is the legal duration of temporary public key C1, and save the information{ID h , C1, T h }.
,and send the cipher text｛V1，T h ｝to user h.
Key Acquisition
（1） After user h receive the information, the following process will be done：
② Verify the truth of formula C2 + P m 1 = V1. If the result is false, authentication is failed.
③ If the authentication passed, user h calculates e = H( ℎ ), C4 = k ⋅ Y LRA + e ⋅ G; and send the message {ID h , C4}to LRA.
（2） LRA verify the legality of user h ,the detail procedure is as below: ② If the identity of user h is legal, then select an private key d H randomly which is not existed in the database. Calculate m2 = d H ⨁T h ⊕ ID h , and present m2 as a domain element P m 2 , and select a random r ,calculate V2 = r ⋅ G = (x3, y3),if x3 mod n = 0，then return to reselect r.
③ Calculate V3 = r ⋅ C1 = (x4, y4)，if x4 mod n = 0，then return to step ② to reselect r.
④ Generate the cipher text S * = {V2, P m 2 + V3} and send to user h. （3）the user h does the following calculation by using temporary private key k of itself：
equal to V,and delete { ℎ , C1, ℎ } if the verification result is legal. LRA destroy the temporary public key and temporary private key.
User authentication
The authentication solution is specified as below by with the example of user IDA and user IDB, and detail specification of the authentication flow: ⑤ After IDA decrypt message with its own private key d A and k，get 
2.Security analyses
The security of this solution includes two parts: 1）It is secure during the key acquisition. 2）the procedure of identity realization is logical and correct.
Security during the key acquisition
The procedure of key acquisition is secure, which can demonstrate as below three situations.
（1）if the attacker IDC pretend to be the identity of ℎ , the authentication will failed.
Proof：
③ LRA verify C3 = ⋅ 1 + H( ) ⋅ is true by using . It is equal to verify ′ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ 1， IDC to be able to guess k' to make the LRA verification to be passed, that is solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So validation bound to fail.
（2）If the attacker IDC counterfeit identity of LRA, authentication will fail. Proof：
and send ｛V1'， ℎ '｝ to user h;
,and then verify the truth of C2 + P m 1' = V1 to confirm the message is from LRA. It is equal to verify ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ； If the verification pass, except attacker can get the private key of LRA, it is impossible, so verification is bound to fail.
（3）if the attacker do the intermediate attack, key can't acquired yet. If the attacker attack * = { 2, 2 + 3}，however the attacker can't acquire k of user h, thus it can't solve * to acquire 2 ，which means attacker is impossible to acquire private key of user h assigned by LRA.
Logicality and correction of the identity authentication procedure
（1）logicality of the authentication procedure The message of {R, S, T} can only be decrypted by IDB because only IDB knows to get the identity of IDA. Only IDA can decrypt * because only IDA knows A and fresh digit k to get the legal identity of IDB.
（2）Correct of authentication procedure If the attacker attacks {R,S,T}, user IDB can use its own private key to pass the authentication, however it cannot decrypt{R,S,T} to get m ′ ,so IDB unable to get the identity of IDA, so the attacker will fail to counterfeit identity of IDA. If the attacker counterfeit identity of IDB and send * message to IDA, however the attacker cannot get d B . Thus user IDA can't pass the signature of message * by public key authentication of IDB. As the result, counterfeit of IDB fails as well.
3.Efficiency Analyses
The solution select SQL Serve2008 database in VC # .NET integrated environment to realize ECC encryption and ELGamal decryption and transmission. The system efficiency can be evaluated from Computational overhead, Key Length and required bandwidth.
（1）Computational overhead analysis Computational overhead and computational load is the amount of computation required to complete the encryption and decryption (The number of time units required). From the analysis of table1 ECC computation overload is smaller than ECC computation overload and has the advantage of faster processing. 
Conclusions
Based on the full analysis of the various deficiencies of the prior existence of identity authentication technology, based on the research results for reference, this paper propose a suitable authentication solution for lightweight mobile device. The solution has a high data security, fast data processing capabilities and lower data transfer bandwidth, suitable for mobile terminal authentication and digital signatures wireless network environment.
